Others emphasized the necessity to use the strategic transparency to limit the practices of administrational corruption, through detecting the reality of the real corruption, building the organizational support of transparency in the State institutions, and diversifying the sources of information related to corruption. In addition, some interlocutors see that it is not possible to build the country based on the concept of the state, institutionalism and separating the authorities in the presence of many high-ranking persons who have a mentality that has no room for Iraq and Iraqis with all their sects, beliefs, ethnic and intellectual affiliations. Lastly, discussion was made about the cancelation of the offices of inspectors general and the pros and cons of the decision.

Conclusions:

·         Reform cannot be achieved without defining the real imbalance, especially that Iraq is going through a crucial historical stage of preserving its land and the future of its people, and rebuilding its sovereignty among the states.

·         The corruption in Iraq became an integrated well-organized system that covers all its activities with a legal cover, making it difficult to detect the corruption whose sides are interrelated.

·         Corruption is not a weird phenomenon in the societies, even the ancient ones, and it eliminated several states and kingdoms, especially when corruption becomes the way or approach of the State officials and senior employees.

·         Iraq is still experiencing a culture of obscurantism, cover-ups and nondisclosure of the data and information of the State offices, as well as the lack of the principle of transparency in their work.

·         The current laws and legislations are enough to hold accountable the corrupted and whoever violates the laws and causes damage to Iraq.

Recommendations:

·         We must establish a strong and solid basis to fight corruption, which is the line between being or not. Therefore, we must read the reality without bias, stay away from the factional interests, and think about the interest of Iraq and its people entirely.

·         We need mechanisms that enable us to fragment the corruption system and prevent its reformation. Also, we need educational, cultural and awareness raising curriculum to fight corruption.

·         We must use the abrasive strategy to eliminate the big ringleaders of corruption, and use the strategy of partnership or participatory that includes seeking help from international organizations and observers to eliminate all kinds of corruption.

·         The culture of transparency, clarity and accountability of the State employees must be consolidated and made one of the fundamental pillars for the strategic development to fight corruption, facing all the behaviors that are not consistent with the laws in general.

·         Iraq really needs a true and strong will to hold the corrupted accountable without the interference of parties or tribes, which entails a strong government that has a common view and is not subjective to political parties through quota.

Names of some participating members during the week:

(1)   Dr. Yousef Al-Taai

(2)   Dr. Hashim Fawzi Al-Abadi

(3)   Dr. Hammam Al-Shamaa

(4)   Mr. Thaer Al-Dulaimi

(5)   Mr. Riyad Al-Fartousi

(6)   Mr. Husam Al-Ghazali

(7)   Mr. Abdul Zahra Al-Hindawi

(8)   Mr. Salam Khalid

(9)   Mr. Jawad Al-Attar

(10)  Mr. Lukman Al-Fili

(11)  Mr. Hesham Al-Shadidi

(12)  Mr. Ibrahim Al-Abadi